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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fellow economists’ views on natural resource scarcity range from fear of 
catastrophic consequences to an unsettling lack of apprehension, something 
not uncommon in economics.  Malthus hypothesized at the turn of the 
eighteenth century on recurrent cataclysms caused by population growth 
exceeding food growth.1  Two centuries later, theorists of new growth 
economics consecrate knowledge as the solution to the quandary of 
diminishing returns that natural resources pose as factors of production.2  
Optimistic and pessimistic views over resource scarcity have alternated 
throughout history, and interest has recently reignited as increasing and 
volatile prices of food emerge as a new norm.3  This has certainly been the 
case for economists across multiple disciplines, adding to previous 
discussions of how natural resources affect economic growth—and, to a 
lesser extent, how economic growth impacts natural resource availability—
found in Barnett and Morse4 and revised in Simpson, Toman, and Ayres.5  
The effects of natural resource abundance, dependence, and competition are 
increasingly being studied by economists interested in conflict, poverty, 
political stability, and governance.6  These new interests add to the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798). 
 2 Joseph Cortright, New Growth Theory, Technology, and Learning: A Practitioner’s 
Guide, REV. ECON. DEV. LIT. & PRAC., No. 4 (2001), at 4.  
 3 The World Bank, FOOD PRICE WATCH (Nov. 2012), available at http://siteresources.world 
bank.org/EXTPOVERTY/Resources/336991-1311966520397/Food-Price-Watch-November-20 
12.htm. 
 4 Harold J. Barnett & Chandler Morse, Resources for the Future, Scarcity and Growth, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE AVAILABILITY (1963). 
 5 R. DAVID SIMPSON ET AL., SCARCITY AND GROWTH IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: SUMMARY 
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 04-01, 2004), available at http://bscw-app1.ethz. 
ch/pub/bscw.cgi/d170325/Simpson_etal_2004.pdf (revisiting and revising Barnett and Morse 
findings). 
 6 See generally THE INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., THE WORLD BANK, 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPINIONS AND ACTIONS (Ian Bannon & Paul 
Collier eds., 2003); Richard M. Auty, Natural Resource Endowment, the State and 
Development Strategy, 9 J. INT’L DEV. 651 (1997); Markus Brückner & Antonio Ciccone, 
International Commodity Prices, Growth and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 120 ECON. J. 519 (2010); Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On Economic Causes of Civil 
War, 50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563 (1998); Philippe Le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: 
Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts, 20 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 561 (2001); Päivil Lujala 
et al., A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 538 
(2005); Michael L. Ross, What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?, 41 J. 
PEACE RESEARCH 337 (2004); JEFFREY SACHS & ANDREW WARNER, CENTER FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & HARVARD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
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mainstream focus of agricultural economics on agricultural production, 
international development, resources and environment, and agribusiness.7 
Part of the diversified attention has led to specific proposals beyond the 
traditional and somewhat unsophisticated menu of regulation and taxation of 
natural resource exploitation, formally developed a long time ago by 
Hotelling.8  These include an earnest intention to stop counting 
“consumption of nature” as income, that is, as a free good.9  For example, 
many national account specialists and public and growth economists call 
now for measures of economic product and growth that better capture natural 
capital availability and depreciation.10  A practical example is the 
“sustainable budget index” in Botswana (credited as the most successful 
mineral-based economy in Africa), a policy rule that requires that all mineral 
revenues be reinvested.11  
This recent renewed interest is perhaps a little surprising from a discipline 
defined as the science of scarce resources and how to use them efficiently. 
What  is more surprising is the lack of a universally agreed upon definition 
of what scarcity is within the discipline, not to mention an operational 
classification of scarcity, similar to the geological classification of elements 
                                                                                                                   
Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth (Nov. 1997), http://www.cid.harvard. 
edu/ciddata/warner_files/natresf5.pdf.    
 7 C. Ford Runge, Agricultural Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 8 Hotelling introduces his formal analysis by noting: “Contemplation of the world’s 
disappearing supplies of minerals, forests and other exhaustible assets has led to demands for 
regulation of their exploitation . . . .  Taxation would be a more economic method than 
publicly ordained inefficiency in the case of purely commercial activities such as mining and 
fishing for profit . . . .”  Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. 
ECON. 137, 137 (1931). 
 9 William K. Tabb, Resource Wars, 58 MONTHLY REV. (2007), available at http://monthly 
review.org/2007/01/01/resource-wars. 
 10 Natural capital is defined as encompassing land, forests, and subsoil resources.  More 
specifically, Hamilton and Ley argue that national wealth shrinks if the proceeds from 
drawing down an asset are not invested.  The picture that results from properly accounting for 
shrinking natural resources—large factor payments abroad and low investments in human 
capital—is a dismal trajectory of unsustainable macroeconomics and wealth dissipation in 
many resource-rich countries.  Kirk Hamilton & Eduardo Ley, Measuring National Income 
and Growth in Resource-Rich, Income-Poor Countries, 28 ECON. PREMISE 1, 2 (2010); see 
also JOSEPH STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON MEASURING ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 17 (2009).  
 11 In addition, Botswana follows another policy rule whereby the total amount of capital 
(including mineral assets and net foreign financial assets) should be maintained at the same 
level.  GLENN-MARIE LANGE & MATTHEW WRIGHT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL 
ECONOMIES: THE EXAMPLE OF BOTSWANA 15 (CEEPA 2002), available at http://www.ceepa. 
co.za/dispapers/botswana_sustain.pdf.  
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as geochemically scarce or abundant.  Geology considers elements that occur 
in the Earth’s crust at average abundances below 0.1% as scarce.12  A similar 
attempt to define land scarcity by an empirical threshold, that is when 70% 
or more of the arable land is under production, has not rallied a wide 
consensus.13  Estimates of the value of subsoil assets by the World Bank 
simplistically assume a lifetime of only twenty years across a number of 
resources ranging from oil and natural gas to gold, bauxite, or copper.14  In 
the absence of a practical and meaningful definition of scarcity in economics, 
Part II reviews different approaches that have been used to understand 
scarcity, from the traditional idea of a physical phenomenon restricted to 
natural resources to more complex concepts that include natural “amenities.”  
Part III argues in favor of a pragmatic definition that avoids an elusive and 
complex conceptualization.  The proposed definition will instead focus on 
the relevant features of resources.  Part IV discusses the prospective trends of 
one of the most important scarcities that has recently attracted critical 
attention, namely food scarcity, despite the resource being renewable and 
inexhaustible.  Part V reflects on the policy aspects of resource scarcity and 
provides concluding remarks.  
II.  ECONOMICS OF SCARCITY 101: BEYOND PHYSICAL SCARCITY 
Economics is the science of scarce resources and how to use them 
efficiently (or, in the jargon, how to optimally achieve an objective at the 
lowest cost possible).  As such, scarcity is a concept as old as economics—
perhaps older. Quintus Tertullianus wrote in A.D. 200 that pestilence, 
hunger, war, and floods were all consequences of resources being “scarcely 
adequate to us,” the human race.  He enumerated deforestation, loss of 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Based on this criterion, there are twelve abundant elements and ninety or so known 
scarce elements, with aluminum, iron, magnesium, and manganese accounting for 99.23% of 
the mass of the earth’s continental crust.  Robert Ayres, Resources, Scarcity, Growth, and the 
Environment 10 (Ctr. Mgmt. Env’t Resources, Working Paper No. 2000/31/EPS/CMER, 
2001).  See also JAMES R. CRAIG ET AL., RESOURCES OF THE EARTH: ORIGIN, USE, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 279–333 (3d ed. 2001).  
 13 See THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 63–64 (1999).  
Burns points to the absence of tests or any systematic analysis to come up with the 70% 
threshold, suggesting that it might be an educated guess.  Thomas J. Burns, Environment, 
Scarcity, and Violence by Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 7 HUMAN ECOL. REV. 76, 76 (2000), 
available at http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her71/71bookreviews.pdf. 
 14 WORLD BANK, WHERE IS THE WEALTH OF NATIONS? (2006) (the exact list of assets 
includes oil, natural gas, hard coal, soft coal, bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, 
phosphate rock, silver, tin and zinc.  Some 127 countries are covered; estimates refer to 2000 
values.).  
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biological diversity, farming unsuitable land, and urbanization as observed 
effects of scarcity.15  Food shortages are believed to have contributed to the 
demise of early civilizations like the Sumerians and the Mayans, whose food 
systems were brought down by soil degradation.16  Scarcity was at the center 
of the widely known arguments popularized by Malthus’s 1798 Essay on the 
Principle of Population.  He argued that populations tend to grow 
geometrically, while food production grows arithmetically, resulting in 
increasing population pressures on resources, leading often to catastrophic 
consequences.17  David Ricardo’s theory of rent rests on the very principle 
that resources (he originally referred to land) are of different quality and in 
short and unequal supply.18  Among the gloomy views on scarcity, another of 
the fathers of modern economics, Alfred Marshall, wrote that “[t]he world is 
really a very small place, and there is no room in it for the opening up of rich 
new resources . . . .  When new countries begin to need most of their own 
food and other raw produce, improvements in transport will count for 
little.”19 
Doomsday views are also common in current times.  It is fairly common 
these days to read news such as the killings of dozens in Kenya as a result of 
tribal fighting triggered by confrontation over scarce pasture for livestock.20  
In the case of oil, Tabb argues that as China’s income levels get closer to 
those in the United States, the ownership of cars will increase and may reach 
one billion by 2031: if they all need to run on gasoline, Tabb argues, there 
would not be enough oil to power them.21  Brown predicts that the depletion 
of underground water is even more threatening than depletion of oil 
resources.22  Some eighteen countries (including China, India, and the United 
                                                                                                                   
 15 SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 5. 
 16 LESTER R. BROWN, FULL PLANET, EMPTY PLATES: THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF FOOD 
SCARCITY 6 (2012). 
 17 MALTHUS, supra note 1. 
 18 So lands endowed with plentiful resources benefit from higher prices as population and, 
consequently, demand increases until marginal lands are tapped.  Development, accompanied 
by increasing demands on food, will increase prices and create rents for landlords, which 
Ricardo considered a waste to society (ignoring the possibility of such rents being invested), 
and increasingly so as land becomes more scarce.  SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 5. 
 19 Id. at 6 (quoting MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL 326 (A.C. Pigou ed., 1925)). 
 20 Reuben Kyama, Clashes Kill Dozens in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A9.  
 21 Tabb, supra note 9.  Tabb argues that oil reserves are largely exaggerated because OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) quotas are based on proven reserves so 
“members exaggerate their reserves to pump more.”  Id. at 5.  Tabb cites Sarkis’ estimates of 
40% of true reserves being exaggerated.  See N. Sarkis, Addicted to Crude, LE MONDE 
DIPLOMATIQUE, May 4, 2006. 
 22 BROWN, supra note 16, at 57.  Brown eloquently argues that increasing population (at 80 
million per year), consumers moving up the food chain, and the use of grains to fuel cars have 
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States) currently produce food by what he describes as overpumping their 
aquifers.23  Partially related to this, the old practice of looking for land 
abroad—formerly restricted only to empires—has gained momentum in 
recent years alongside food price spikes.  Citing Deininger and Byerlee’s 
data, Brown reports 464 projects between October 2008 and August 2009 
involving land acquisition of an area exceeding the land dedicated to 
producing corn and wheat combined in the United States.24 
All of these views25 are rooted in the concept of scarcity of natural 
resources as fundamentally a physical phenomenon.  As physical resources 
become scarce, additional human workforce and capital will produce 
progressively lower outputs.  This is the law of diminishing returns, which 
explains the concept of “marginal value.”  As eloquently explained in 
Simpson, Toman and Ayres, marginal value is the reason why a gallon of 
water, despite being fundamental for everyday life and exhaustible, is sold at 
a price much lower than a diamond, which is not critical for life.  For any 
given period of time, there is plenty of water available or accessible, so an 
additional liter does not bear much of the marginal value compared with the 
very limited supply of diamonds.26  Unfortunately, this marginal value is 
only part of a more complex story in which the prices of both water and 
diamonds fail to truly take into account the destruction of irreplaceable 
environmental capital.27  
Ironically, it is also the concept of marginal value that explains the 
optimistic views of many economists.  John Stuart Mill argued that the law 
                                                                                                                   
led almost overnight to a doubling of the world’s annual consumption of grain—from 21 
million tons per year between 1990 and 2005 to 45 million tons per year from 2005 to 2011. 
This is taking place at a time when aquifers are being depleted in most populous countries; 
grain yields are hitting a glass ceiling; and the temperature is rising, which ultimately will also 
affect agriculture yields. 
 23 Id. at 61. 
 24 Id. at 103.  Out of the 464 projects, in only 203 was the amount of land involved known. 
Land grabs in those projects amounted to 140 million acres—more than the area of the U.S.A. 
dedicated to producing corn and wheat combined, and only 37% of the projects involved food 
crops (of those for which information was available). Id.; see also KLAUS DEININGER & DEREK 
BYERLEE, THE WORLD BANK, RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD 
SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? (2011). 
 25 Interestingly, for each pessimistic view, there seems to exist an optimistic one: see 
Leonardo Maugeri, Two Cheers for Expensive Oil, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2006 (on oil 
reserves); GORDON CONWAY & KATY WILSON, ONE BILLION HUNGRY: CAN WE FEED THE 
WORLD? (2012), available at https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment/ 
Public/Policy%20Briefing%20paper%20-%20final.pdf (on food availability). 
 26 SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 6. 
 27 Ayres, supra note 12, at 9.  This is a clear shortcoming in their pricing as it is equivalent 
to deny that an investment in reproducible capital is an increase in the capital stock. Id. 
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of diminishing returns can be “suspended or temporarily controlled, by 
whatever adds to the general power of mankind over nature and especially by 
any extension of their knowledge.”28  In effect, many economists saw 
knowledge as the solution to the Malthusian conundrum: Clark leaves no 
room for doubt when he argues that “knowledge is the only instrument of 
production not subject to diminishing returns.”29  Technological progress 
(first unexplained,30 then the result of investments in research and 
development31 and human capital formation in education32) would ensure 
either constant or increasing returns, allowing capital accumulation to 
infinity.  Once the issue of diminishing returns is solved, physical scarcity of 
a given factor of production is no longer the fundamental constraint on 
growth and development.  
In fact, Krautkraemer argues that evidence so far indicates a bias toward 
repeatedly underestimating the capacity of technology to overcome natural 
resource scarcity with “many predictions of impending doom” when it comes 
to natural resources not coming through.33  He wrote this before the 
international food price crisis started to spike in 2008, arguing that the 
discovery of new reserves, substitution of capital, resource-saving 
technological progress, and new methods for recovering resources “have [all] 
led to generally downward sloping price trends for many natural resources 
commodities.”34  
Ayres provides compelling historical illustrations of this pattern.  
Charcoal was scarce in England by the seventeenth century as land was 
cleared for agriculture, shipbuilding, and grazing.35  Coal eventually emerged 
as a substitute for charcoal.36  Sperm whales were the main source for lamp 
oil, but their shortages gave way to kerosene (derived from petroleum, a low-
                                                                                                                   
 28 SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
 29 Id. at 9 (quoting John Maurice Clark, Overhead Costs in Modern Industry, 31 J. POL. 
ECON. 47 (1923)). 
 30 Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65, 
66 (1956) (treating technological change as a variable correlated to available labor and 
capital). 
 31 Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002 
(1986). 
 32 Robert E. Lucas Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3 (1988). 
 33 Jeffery A. Krautkraemer, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, Economics of Natural Resource 
Scarcity: The State of the Debate 12 (Discussion Paper 05-14, Resources for the Future, 
2005). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Ayres, supra note 12, at 5.  
 36 Id. 
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value product in those days) as a substitute in the mid-nineteenth century.37  
Guano, a natural fertilizer from South America, was almost exhausted by the 
end of the nineteenth century but was later substituted by phosphate from 
bones, mineral apatites, and, finally, from synthetic ammonia.38  Similarly, 
synthetic rubber became available as natural rubber increasingly became 
scarce for the western world following Japan’s control of key rubber-
producing centers at the onset of World War II.39  Other modern examples of 
fiber optics for copper include the substitution of fiber optics for copper in 
telecommunications and insulation and thermal pane windows substituting 
for the use of natural resources.  Krautkraemer also argues that the ability of 
capital to substitute for natural resources has shifted the mix of goods 
produced in an economy from more to less resource-intensive commodities.40  
From these examples, Ayres concludes that: “Up to now, scarcities have not 
proven to be obstacles for economic growth; more often than not they have 
been stimulants to innovation.”41 
These examples underscore that the critical connection between physical 
scarcity and marginal returns has been dominated by supply considerations 
alone.  But an economic analysis of scarcity naturally requires a demand 
angle as well.  When both are considered, scarcity is a situation where 
demand exceeds supply, whether or not the supply side is physically 
constrained.  Scarcity or shortage thus becomes fundamentally an economic 
circumstance not only determined by physical availability, but also by factors 
as disparate as logistics and preferences. In fact, from the strictest and 
simplest theoretical economics perspective, scarcity is not even a problem, 
because it cannot be a steady state.  Well-functioning prices will act as 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. at 6. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Krautkraemer, supra note 33, at 36 (citing the Energy Information Agency, 
Krautkraemer reports that the energy used to produce one dollar of GDP in the United States 
between 1949 and 2000 almost halved.  Yet, the total energy use tripled as population doubled 
and per capita GDP increased.). 
 41 Ayres, supra note 12, at 6.  However, how useful are those arguments whose conclusions 
depend on what is compared and the very length of the periods under comparison?  I have 
argued that conclusions from intertemporal comparisons in social sciences are very sensitive 
to the periods considered.  Jose Cuesta, Theory of Empirics of Democracy and Crime 
Revisited: How Much Further Can We Go with Existing Data and Methodologies?, 72 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 645 (2013).  In addition, Krautkraemer warns against the use of economic 
measures as indicators of resource scarcities: prices, extraction costs, and user costs are in 
practice limited  because they are static, imperfect, and supply side only (in the case of 
extraction costs) to account for future availability and demand.  Krautkraemer, supra note 33, 
at 16. 
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clearing-house mechanisms toward ensuring a permanent equilibrium by 
presumably rationing demand, increasing supply, or both.  From this angle, 
the problem is not physical scarcity but those obstacles that prevent markets 
from clearing.  As physical constraints start to appear, the market will 
provide the economic rationale, that is to say the incentives, for innovation 
and substitution.  Consequently, free and adequate functioning of markets, 
rather than the physical scarcity of resources, become the center of attention 
for theoretical economists.  
Yet there are a number of situations that also make physical scarcity a 
handicap in the economic sense—at least in the applied economic sense of 
achieving economic growth.  For example, resources like fresh water are 
required in such massive quantities that substitutes are out of the question 
and technological innovation may prove useless after some threshold.42  In 
effect, even if fresh water can be obtained through desalination of salt water, 
the process is very energy-intensive, therefore some argue that available 
energy becomes the key to finding a substitute for scarce resources.43  
Physical availability may also be subject to uncertainty.  For example, the 
World Bank estimates of subsoil wealth mentioned earlier require a set of 
strong assumptions, such as simplistic lifetimes of twenty years, specific 
growth rates for prices and extraction costs, and universal discount rates.44  
In the case of uncertainty, the extent to which the magnitude of reserves is 
known affects prices.  The new G-20 Agriculture Market Information System 
(AMIS), which is designed to improve information on agricultural markets, 
shows substantial differences in the estimates of grain stocks in Asian 
countries depending on whether the data are reported by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the United States Department of 
Agriculture (without any clear and obvious bias).  Thus, for example, the 
differences in grain stock estimates for 2012–2013 vary by 13% in China, 
32% in Indonesia, and 53% in Vietnam (similar to differences of over 40% 
in Brazil and Kazakhstan), according to the AMIS.45  The fact that food 
stocks are not known with precision does affect the prices of thinly traded 
food commodities and may make international prices hypersensitive to non-
fundamental factors determining demand and supply of food.  In addition, 
assessments of undiscovered world oil produce scenarios based on prospects 
                                                                                                                   
 42 SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 34. 
 43 In this sense, Weinberg declared energy as the “ultimate resource.”  Alvin M. Weinberg, 
Reflections on the Energy Wars, 66 AM. SCI. 153 (1978). 
 44 WORLD BANK, supra note 14; see also discussion supra Part I. 
 45 Statistics at a Glance, AMIS AGRICULTURE MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM, http://statisti 
cs.amis-outlook.org/data/index.html (using the 2012 figures). 
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of reserves (the Greenland shelf, offshore Suriname, and deposits under the 
Caspian Sea, for instance) and the expected performance of future 
exploration.  As such, models of global peak production produce intrinsically 
uncertain predictions46 and may well themselves contribute to a higher 
sensitivity of prices to events, shocks, or circumstances that, in the case of 
oil, may have nothing to do with long-term demand and supply 
fundamentals.  
Uncertainty refers not only to resource stocks and future discoveries but 
also to future interest rates.  In effect, finding a market-clearing solution that 
implies intertemporal considerations, as is critically the case in relation to 
exhaustible resources, requires discounting present consumption.  
Discounting implies comparing present and future consumption and 
determining the rate at which today’s consumption and future consumption 
are indifferent for the average individual.  Economists have typically 
assumed that this inter-temporal discount rate equalizes real interest rates, so 
current savings and future consumption are valued equally.  For this 
approximation to work, the “cake” can never completely disappear, which 
denies the very nature of exhaustibility.47  The exercise becomes more 
difficult when this cake refers to a priceless resource, that is, a resource for 
which markets do not exist, such as biodiversity or climatic stability.  
Economists also assume that everything with a value can be sold and bought, 
which denies in practical terms the irreversible nature of goods or services.  
An exhausted resource or a severely degraded environment cannot be bought 
in a next period, which means that it will not have any value into the future 
and, consequently, today’s value needs to be adjusted.   
Furthermore, Sjak Smulders argues that even if technology can avert 
diminishing returns by improving production techniques or by creating 
opportunities for substitution away from scarce resources, it may also create 
undesired effects on resources.48  For example, technological fishing 
developments have led to a more rapid decline in fish stocks.49  Simpson, 
                                                                                                                   
 46 For example, Ayres reports that Hubbert predicted global peak production would happen 
just before the year 2000.  Ayers, supra note 12, at 12; see also M. King Hubbert, Energy 
Resources, in RESOURCES AND MAN 157 (Commission on Resources and Man: National 
Academy of Sciences – National Resource Council 1969).  Campbell and Laherrere predicted 
global peak production by shortly before 2010.  Colin Campbell & Jean Laherrere, The End of 
Cheap Oil, 1998 SCI. AM. 78, 79. 
 47 Ayres, supra note 12, at 19. 
 48 Sjak Smulders, Endogenous Technological Change, Natural Resources and Growth, in 
SCARCITY AND GROWTH REVISITED: NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 155 (R. David Simpson et al. eds., 2004). 
 49 Id. at 160. 
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Toman, and Ayres argue that nuclear power provides electricity without 
conventional greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but at the cost of hard-to-
manage toxic waste.50  Technological innovation is, like any other economic 
activity, one that responds to economic incentives and as such may be 
influenced by perverse subsidies; underprovision of a public good (whose 
benefits are appropriated by individuals who did not pay for them); and 
imperfect information.  Ayres argues that if one cannot predict their ultimate 
applications, a society will have a hard time identifying the potential 
innovations it should invest in.51 
III.  FROM THE ELUSIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SCARCITY TO 
IDENTIFYING PROPERTIES OF SCARCITY 
Economic and physical dimensions of scarcity are not, however, two 
separate approaches to the concept of scarcity: they intersect and interact 
mutually.  A first, critical, and complex interaction is that physical scarcity 
itself may or may not have an effect on economic value.  In other words, 
there is not an inevitable economic value in something that is physically 
scarce or rare.  In the case of materials found in the Earth’s crust mentioned 
in the introduction, their value is based not on how uncommon they are but 
on their physical properties and how difficult it is to work with them.  Metals 
like beryllium or rubidium, some of the most common metals in the earth’s 
crust, have virtually no industrial uses.52  Unsurprisingly, abundant metals 
have very different costs per gram.  
Let us steer away from natural resources for a moment.  A masterpiece 
painting is valuable because it is unique, produced by an artist whose talent 
is scarcely distributed across society and time.  Certainly that same painting 
can be reproduced an infinite number of times—into worthless fakes—but 
even the uniqueness of the original does not guarantee an automatic 
economic value.  Van Gogh’s paintings were notoriously worthless in his 
lifetime.  For investors, they have a hefty economic value today because they 
have a widely acknowledged investment value.  Society agrees (or more 
precisely, keeps agreeing after Van Gogh’s death) that Van Gogh’s scarce 
talent will continue to appreciate in the future, so purchasing his unique 
paintings today will translate into future value.  Yet, this agreement may 
change in the future—as it did in the past—making scarcity of talent a risky 
investment.  
                                                                                                                   
 50 SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 28. 
 51 Ayres, supra note 12, at 22. 
 52 Id. at 3. 
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If scarcity is by itself not a sufficient condition for economic value, the 
obvious question then is what features of natural resources make them 
economically valuable?  A first candidate to start looking into is the property 
of finite supply, that is, exhaustibility.  Water exists in nature as a finite 
resource.  Even though it is renewable through rainfall or conservation, its 
sources—underground aquifers and glaciers—are exhaustible.  Not all 
sources of fresh water are tapped already (for example, Antarctic and Arctic 
natural stocks of water or undiscovered underground sources), and recycling 
practices and technologies may increase the world’s supply of fresh water in 
a given period of time by effectively slowing down its depletion rate.  Land 
provides a similar example.  By the physical limitations of space on our 
planet, land is neither infinite nor renewable, even though some areas not apt 
for agriculture can be adapted for this use or, alternatively, arable land can be 
used for alternative activities without limiting the production of food if yields 
were to improve.  
Food, fisheries, forests, and sunlight constitute different cases.  They are 
renewable.  They, of course, can disappear as a result of the actions or 
omissions of humans, nature, or both, such as floods, droughts, wars, or 
pandemics.  However, those resources are subject to net increases in a 
continuous, uninterrupted fashion.  For example, in the case of food, with 
each successive crop more food becomes available globally.  
Some authors differentiate between resources that are renewable at a 
relatively slow rate and others that accrue at a rapid rate.  For example, 
forests would be in the former group while sunlight, fisheries, or food would 
belong to the latter.  However, what slow and rapid mean in this context is 
not precisely spelled out: Do they refer to absolute measures of time (say, 
less than a year or a day?) or more generally to an economic concept, that is, 
slow or fast in relation to a theoretical optimal level of use of resources?53  
So, does renewability (and its speed) affect the economic value of a 
resource?  It depends.  The current economic values of sunlight and water are 
very different, even though both resources are critical in environmental and 
biological terms to preserving life on Earth.  The difference lies in that water 
is easily marketed while sunlight is not.  Sunlight requires a currently costly 
technology that transforms this resource into solar energy and distributes it 
from point A to point B.  Here, the economic value of the resource is 
determined by the supply technology and not by its renewability or its final 
use.  A more extreme example would be water compared to perfume.  A liter 
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of French perfume has a much heftier tag than a liter of water not because 
perfume has a more critical end use than water or because perfume is a more 
finite commodity than water (water is of course a critical component of 
perfume), but because production costs to supply the respective quantities of 
each resource demanded by the market make perfume more costly than 
water.  Interestingly, a liter of cola, which requires more water to produce 
than perfume,54 is cheaper than perfume.  The technology that produces and 
distributes soda in mass quantities allows for such a cheap product.  As 
indicated above, clearly each liter of soda does not include in its price its 
contribution to the reduction of water in the future, typically without doing 
much or anything to recycle it.  This is true even in places with obvious 
water restrictions like Saudi Arabia, where the cost of a bottle of water is 
U.S. $0.27, below the cost of a popular soda—U.S. $0.40 for the same size 
bottle.55  Conflict literature has discussed certain properties of resources that 
make them more prone to association with conflict, to the extent that such 
properties make them more likely to generate the revenues and/or grievances 
necessary to fuel conflict.  Four features are typically said to have an impact 
on conflict: LOOTABILITY, that is, how easy it is to extract resources;56 
PROXIMITY TO ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, OR MILITARY POWER CENTERS;57 
CONCENTRATION, that is, whether resources are found “point-sourced” in 
specific geographic areas or diffused across vast territories;58 and 
SELLABILITY, that is, how easily they can be sold in regulated or unregulated 
international markets.59  Resources’ ultimate capacity to finance conflict 
varies; for example, diamonds sold in international markets with little 
transparency may help both governments and rebels alike, whereas oil, sold 
in more regulated markets, tends to only help governments.  Lootable (that 
is, alluvial) diamonds have a strong positive relationship with civil war, 
while non-lootable (underground) diamonds may have a strong negative 
relationship with war onset.  Underground diamonds need large investments 
                                                                                                                   
 54 An article in the Economist reports that almost three liters of water are needed to produce 
one liter of a well-known cola; the three liters include not only the water content of the product, 
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Water, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/node/4492835. 
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Prices in Saudi Arabia, NUMBEO, http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/country_result.jsp? 
country=Saudi+Arabia&displayCurrency=USD (last updated Sept. 2013). 
 56 Tony Addison et al., Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour, 11 J. AFR. 
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 57 Le Billon, supra note 6, at 569. 
 58 Id. at 570; see also World Bank, supra note 3. 
 59 Lujala et al., supra note 6, at 542. 
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for extraction, and investments of that magnitude are more likely in 
politically stable contexts.  If natural resources are diffuse and distant from 
power, then warlordism is likely to emerge; if natural resources are diffuse 
and proximate, rebellion and rioting are more likely; if resources are 
concentrated and proximate to power, coups are more likely.60 
Natural resources may not only generate grievances and mobilize 
resources internally but also across nations.  It is true that civil wars 
associated with natural resources have been driven by all sorts of 
commodities from oil, diamonds, gems, and precious and nonprecious metals 
to copper, timber, narcotics, and even various agricultural resources.61  
However, while all resources are equally likely to trigger civil war, some 
resources are more prone than others to be used, as described by Fang, 
Jaffee, and Temzelides, as a “tool of statecraft and diplomatic leverage.”62  In 
other words, some natural resources can play a substantive international 
geopolitical role.  Klare argues that about four-fifths of the world’s known 
petroleum reserves lie in politically unstable or contested areas, and many 
other sources of vital resources such as gas, water, and timber are also 
located in “chronically unstable areas.”63  Not surprisingly, many states see 
controlling certain natural resources as a matter of national security. It is 
generally argued that if the Russian Federation—a major world exporter of 
oil and natural gas—formed a gas cartel with Middle Eastern countries 
(mainly Qatar) or became part of the OPEC cartel on oil (alongside Saudi 
Arabia), this would significantly change the way energy markets operate and, 
ultimately, would have a large influence on international relations.64  
Water and land are other such geopolitical commodities.  As Brown 
reminds us, any water extracted from the Upper Nile River Basin to irrigate 
Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan will not reach the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Le Billon, supra note 6, at 570. 
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 62 SUNGYANG FANG ET AL., JAMES A. BAKER III, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE 
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 63 Michael T. Klare, The New Geography of Conflict, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 49 (2001). 
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and the United States, the increasing attention to domestic demands after the Arab Spring, the 
rising influence of Iran as a regional military and political powerhouse (in part financed by oil 
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thus increasing the number of countries competing for water in the region.65  
Likewise, as food prices increase and become more volatile, exporters are 
more reluctant to make long-term commitments.  This has led large 
importers of grains, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the Republic of Korea, 
to buy or lease land in other countries to grow food for themselves.  
Ironically, these land purchases or “land grabs” involve countries in Africa 
where vast numbers of citizens are sustained by international food 
donations.66 
Natural resources are not only commodities but also “services” known as 
environmental resources, which include biodiversity, climatic stability, clean 
air and water, and wildlife protection.  They are also known as resource 
amenities or ecosystem services, and clearly differ from natural resources 
commonly treated as economic goods.67  The main difference, however, is 
not their service nature but their TRADABILITY.  In effect, resource amenities 
are typically “open access resources” and public goods that lack a 
marketplace and a price mechanism to clear.68  Technology is less likely to 
provide substitutes for resource commodities than resource amenities.69  
Moreover, the poor in particular have no substitutes for filthy water, polluted 
air, or degraded ecosystems, which means that amenities are not luxury 
services but rather fundamental necessities.70 
So, from an economic point of view, physical scarcity—scarce supply—
itself is not a problem and, for many, is a situation that typically sparks 
innovation and substitution.  Economic scarcity, that is, demand exceeding 
supply, is a condition for which economists, policymakers, and lawmakers 
have devised a space (marketplaces), a simple mechanism (prices), and a 
complex surrounding legal system (property rights) that ensure matching 
supply and demand.  Because the real world is not that of Economics 101 
textbooks, uncertainty, imperfect knowledge, myopia, and absence of 
markets, among other factors, take natural resources outside the scope of 
simple market solutions.  Yet, the very nature of natural resources may have 
an important (but not the only) say in their economic value.  Physical 
scarcity by itself may matter more than simple neoclassical economics 
presume, but so does the resource’s storable capacity; its ability to generate 
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revenues and grievance to fuel conflicts; its associated production 
technologies; and its geopolitical value.  
In short, scarcity clearly matters when it has economic implications, 
though these are not always present and may change over time.  These 
economic implications, in turn, may or may not relate to scarcity alone, but 
also to other characteristics such as diffusion, concentration, lootability, and 
renewability.  Concerns should not be restricted only to cases with economic 
value, but neither should we worry about all types of scarcity equally.  If we 
care about the wellbeing of future generations, we should be concerned—a 
lot—about water scarcity, much more so than about the availability of non-
abundant metals with hardly any industrial or commercial application. 
IV.  FROM CONCEPTS TO PRAXIS: FOOD SCARCITY OR SCARCITY OF GOOD 
POLICIES FOR FOOD? 
There is another issue of particular importance that is specific to food and 
water and separates them from other natural resources.71  There are 
biological demands for dignified and healthy life that determine a minimum 
and inevitable demand.  This makes physical and economic scarcity more 
intertwined than in other resources where fashion, perception, or taste 
determines demand.  In fact, food scarcity and hunger as contributors to 
conflict are hardly new.  As indicated above, the realization of their 
association goes back as far as Malthus’ early theses on food, population, 
and catastrophes and continues with food riots in 1848 Europe; recurrent 
famines in conflict-ridden areas in the twentieth century; and numerous food 
riots mushrooming worldwide in 2008—sixty food riots in thirty countries—
and thereafter.72 
According to recent figures from the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
the percentage of hungry people in the world—unable to consume 1,800 kcal 
per person per day—has declined only slightly during the last thirty years, 
from 16% in 1990 to 13% in 2008.73  This modest improvement has been 
insufficient to offset the absolute number of people facing starvation, which 
rose from 848 million in 1990 to 850 million in 2008, and is estimated to 
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increase further due to successive crises in the cost of food, the international 
financial crisis, and the recent famine in the Horn of Africa.74  Asia is home 
to an overwhelming majority (67%) of the global undernourished population, 
with China and India accounting for most of the regional malnutrition.75 
Africa is still home to over a quarter of all undernourished children even 
though food supply has largely kept pace with population growth in most 
African countries since the 1990s. 
In other parts of the world the situation is very different.  East Asia and 
Latin America are the regions that will meet the Millennium Development 
Goal of halving hunger by 2015.  Despite the dismal absolute numbers, 
enormous progress has taken place in China since 1990, as well as in 
Indonesia and the Philippines.  In China alone, the starving population 
declined from 210 million in 1990 to 129 million in 2008.76  At the same 
time, major progress has been made in average caloric intake in China, 
which increased from 2,580 kcal a day per person in 1990 to 2,990 in 2008.77  
At the start of the new century, global agricultural production was 
guaranteeing 17% more calories per person than thirty years earlier, despite a 
70% increase in population.  FAO calculations indicate that this increase is 
sufficient to ensure a daily intake of 2,720 kcal per person.78  All things 
considered, the FAO concludes that the world currently produces enough 
food to feed everyone and even satisfy the diversified demand of a 
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demographically changing world.79  The problem today is that many people 
either do not have land to cultivate, enough income to buy food, or access to 
safety nets to mitigate the impacts of temporary shortages. 
Looking to the future, the food challenge expected for 2050 is similar in 
magnitude to the one faced in the 1960s: the world’s food demand is 
expected to increase by 70% as its population increases to 9 billion.80  The 
obvious question is whether the pace of future agro-technological progress 
will be sufficient to meet the increasing demand for food from the growing 
population.  Alexandratos’s and Bruinsma’s projections maintaining current 
agricultural yield growth suggest that the world would be producing more 
grain than required by the estimated demand through 2050.81  Yields would 
expectedly increase by 44 kg per hectare per year up to 2050, in line with the 
historical trends observed since 1960—even if this absolute increase in 
yields implies declining agricultural productivity in relative terms.82  More 
optimistic scenarios from Nelson et al. in terms of overall productivity 
growth and yields growth specific to maize, wheat, and cassava (exceeding 
2% increases per annum) in developing countries further confirm a favorable 
outcome to the challenge.83  Nelson et al. report a range of caloric 
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availability for the developing world between 2,400 kcal and 3,000 kcal per 
person, depending on assumptions of yield productivity, population and 
income growth, and climate change.84 
These projections should not be taken as downplaying the actual 
challenge of feeding the world’s increasing population, but instead as 
intended to bring food access to the center of the debate alongside food 
production.85  Nor should the role of policies be underestimated.  In fact, 
much has been written about the causes and consequences of the recent food 
crises.86  I  have has summed up the causes of what I call a “perfect storm,” 
where a series of factors, circumstances, and policy choices converged to 
trigger a sudden surge in prices.87  In an example of poor policy-making, 
during 2007 and 2008 the governments of China, India, and Vietnam 
imposed bans or restrictions on the export of rice to neighboring importers 
within the region, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.  
Another recent example of this type of policy is the credit program for 
growers in Thailand (the world’s top exporter of rice) known as the Rice 
Mortgage Scheme.  In this program, the Thai government guarantees 
domestic farmers prices well above market levels, which has resulted in 
substantial loss of competitiveness in Thai rice exports compared to other 
exporters in the region, to the point of threatening Thailand’s status as the 
world’s leading exporter of rice.  
One important aspect of the volatility that surrounds international food 
prices is their heightened sensitivity to a variety of factors, including 
uncertainty about the actual food stocks available, as mentioned in Part II.  
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With respect to safety nets—a critical instrument to mitigate the effects of 
high and volatile food prices and natural disasters—a recent World Bank 
report indicates that between 2008 and 2011, eighty of the 137 countries 
analyzed had weak or nonexistent social welfare systems, and only nine of 
these countries had made a decided effort to improve their systems.88  
Further progress toward transparent information and sound safety nets 
became a missed opportunity in terms of good policy choices in the face of 
the 2007–2008 food price crisis.  
Less cited, however, are the contributions that even lagging regions can 
make—and, in fact, are already making—toward being better prepared for 
future food crises.  Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, several of the 
countries in Asia decided voluntarily to participate in the Agricultural 
Market Information System (AMIS).  Recently, countries such as Pakistan 
and India have stepped up to fill the worldwide gap created by Thailand’s 
increased prices for rice exports.  The Asian and African regions lead the 
way in developing innovative agricultural production practices, which have 
come to be referred to as “smart climate agriculture.”89  The goal of this type 
of agriculture is to simultaneously offer increased agricultural productivity 
(thus reducing poverty and food insecurity); improved crop resistance to 
extreme weather conditions (adaptation); greater sequestration of carbon 
emissions; and curtailment of deforestation (mitigation).90  World Bank 
examples of smart climate agriculture include programs for the restoration of 
mangrove forests in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, which act as a line of defense 
against typhoons91 and floods, and reforestation of the Loess Plateau in 
China.92  Rwanda is developing water-harvest and hillside irrigation.93  Other 
projects in Africa include natural regeneration of forestry in Niger94 and 
conservation farming in Zambia.95  Silvopastoral techniques are being 
developed in Costa Rica.96  A widely cited example is the development of 
financing mechanisms that compensate farmers during the transition to lower 
carbon emissions in the province of Qinghai in the north of China.  Also in 
China, the use of biogas for cooking in the province of Guangxi is estimated 
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to have saved women up to sixty days a year—time they formerly spent 
collecting wood and tending to cooking fires.97  The Asian region, especially 
China, is also piloting other innovative agro-technological practices—for 
example, vertical farming—that could result in considerable increases in 
agricultural productivity.98  
Whether or not the developing world will be able to scale up these 
interventions and sustain them over time essentially will determine the future 
challenges of feeding a growing population.  In turn, these scaled-up 
interventions will be sustainable over time to the extent that—as in the case 
of vertical cultivation—they relax constraints on land availability or benefit 
from technologies and practices that are more economical in the use of water, 
food, or renewable energy.99 
An additional issue is that vast demographic changes100 will most likely 
accompany the growth in global production.  The expected increase in the 
demand and diversity of food will most likely bring about changes in diet 
composition, with a relative reduction in the demand for grains in favor of 
meat, fish, oils, and fruit.  Conservative estimates indicate that the demand 
for meat, dairy products, and vegetable oils could increase more rapidly than 
seen so far in recent decades, with fish and shellfish demand slowing down 
and the demand of grains growing below population growth.  So, the 
argument goes, the future pressure on food supply composition might not 
come from population growth alone but also from the change in the 
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preferences of the emerging population as socioeconomic equalization—that 
is, substantial growth of the middle class—takes place.101  
Even though the expansion of the middle class may look like an 
irreversible process, evidence on global poverty reduction shows that greater 
economic growth does not necessarily lead to equalization.  The World Bank 
estimates that the great majority of the 649 million poor people in the world 
who ceased to be poor (according to the criterion of an income of U.S. $1.25 
per day per person) between 1981 and 2008 still continue to be poor by the 
standards of middle-income and upper-income countries.102  In fact, the 
number of moderately poor—that is, persons with incomes above U.S. $1.25 
a day but less than U.S. $2 a day—increased from 648 million in 1981 to 
1.18 billion in 2008.  Ultimately, evidence shows that the reduction of 
extreme poverty, as critical as it may be, does not necessarily imply an 
automatic increase in the middle class, much less one of the magnitude 
needed for substantive changes to take place in global demand for food.103  It 
remains to be seen whether the case will be the same for demand for other 
scarce resources.  
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Economics deals with the effective use of resources, and yet it does not 
have a clear definition of what scarcity means as other disciplines, such as 
geology, have.  A generic definition of scarcity is demand exceeding supply.  
It is generic because it can be applied to natural resources as well as other 
types of commodities and services.  Under this proposition, the economics of 
resource scarcity is very much in line with any other factor of production, 
namely getting the right price by constructing the appropriate instruments, 
incentives, and institutions for prices and markets to work toward the 
efficient allocation of resources.  From a mere economic point of view, 
                                                                                                                   
 101 See generally id. 
 102 SHAOHUA CHEN & MARTIN RAVALLION, DEV. RES. GROUP, WORLD BANK, AN UPDATE TO 
THE WORLD BANK’S ESTIMATES OF CONSUMPTION POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 2 
(2012). 
 103 The Latin America region has experienced a most impressive reduction in poverty: 
countries like Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay have middle classes of around 
50% of their respective populations—measured as those earning income between U.S. $10 
and U.S. $100 a day—which is far above the proportions in other countries of the region.  
MAURICIO CÁRDENAS ET AL., BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, LATIN AMERICA’S GLOBAL MIDDLE 
CLASS 23 (2011).  Even more demanding figures on the expected share of middle class in the 
total population are reported for Asia by 2050: 70% in India, 75% in China, and 80% in 
Indonesia (using an income of U.S. $2–U.S. $4 per day per person to define middle class).  
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physical shortage or exhaustible supplies typically prompt demand rationing, 
substitution, or technological change.  Numerous historical examples 
validate this analysis and have given way to an unyielding trust in knowledge 
as the solution to old Malthusian fears.  
This convenient explanation, however, overlooks a number of issues 
specific to natural resources in limited supply.  There are many reasons why 
markets may not function well or technology may not solve the Malthusian 
conundrum in a systematic fashion.  Demand for some of these resources, 
such as water, is of such magnitude that it cannot simply be substituted for.  
Natural resources (and our knowledge about them) are subject to a scope of 
long-term uncertainty not easily comparable with other resources.  This 
delinks markets and individual behavior from fundamentals and subjects 
them to geopolitical pressures, panic shocks, and hypersensitivity to 
imperfect knowledge—in addition to other usual problems of global public 
goods for which the standard economic fundamentals do not work.  
In specific cases, the public good associated with natural resources also 
has unintended consequences.  For example, how can we encourage 
innovation (to improve sustainability, welfare, or both) in the substitution of 
essential exhaustible resources without creating increased demand for toxic 
or energy-intensive materials?  For instance, prohibiting the use of heavy 
structures may increase demand for light plastics.104  In order to be effective, 
simple solutions, such as banning solders or painters from using lead or 
photographic film from using silver, need technological interventions or 
timely economic incentives.  One cannot presume ex ante that all business, 
political, and social interests will be aligned at just the right time so that 
changes can occur.105  Especially troublesome are cases for which the 
allocation of property rights associated with the resource is difficult.  Subsoil 
minerals belong to a country—even though the mere presence of these 
resources may create breakaway tensions.  But some resources, such as 
rivers, may exceed national boundaries; others, such as land or diamonds, 
may be easily appropriable (legally or illegally) by other nations; and still 
others, such as fisheries, may migrate across national boundaries.  
                                                                                                                   
 104 Ayres, supra note 12, at 22.  Simpson, Toman, and Ayres also illustrate this point by 
suggesting that even “a tax on carbon dioxide emissions that led “farmers to plant renewable 
energy crops [might] in the process expand land under cultivation [and] reduce biodiversity.” 
SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. 
 105  These problems are also observed in solutions such as optimal taxation or quotas, which 
often in practice go beyond a theoretical argumentation and typically bring on a cumbersome 
power struggle among vested groups. 
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Furthermore, it has been widely proven that certain characteristics of 
resources are more likely to be associated with conflict, which has important 
consequences for their extraction and supply and, ultimately, for the well-
being of populations.  Some of these features are lootability, proximity to 
power, concentration, legality, geopolitical strategic power, and tradability, 
all of which add to the significance of renewability as a critical feature of 
natural resources.  
Yet, there are two other distributional considerations associated with 
some natural resources that constitute special features.  Minimum levels of 
fresh water, clean air, and food are absolutely required for humans to live 
and prosper, and they do not have substitutes. In addition, consumption today 
has inter-temporal consequences tomorrow, which economists typically 
solve with a convenient discount rate.  This technical solution does not fully 
deal with the fact that intertemporal consumption decisions are 
fundamentally an asymmetric equity problem.  In effect, tomorrow’s 
decisions are constrained by today’s decisions but not vice versa.  Future 
generations cannot simply bring back a completely depleted resource.  
All of these considerations make scarcity of natural resources a complex 
issue beyond the simple economics of scarcity.  This complexity does not 
mean that natural resource scarcity always constitutes a problem: for 
example, this is the case when the scarce resources are not demanded or 
when they have no economic value at all—both facts which can change over 
time, however.  But unremitting optimists also need to acknowledge that 
economic solutions (taxes, restrictions, substitution, and technological 
change) will not be able to solve every natural resource availability problem.  
This has implications not only for economic policy but also for both 
national and international law, the latter specifically when resource scarcity 
or abundance transcends national boundaries.  International laws regarding 
the environment, seas, outer-space, trade, and property are all testament to 
this shared concern.  If economic policy is about the development of 
economic institutions, incentives, and instruments, then the practice of law 
needs, at the least, to ensure that well-functioning institutions are enforced 
and obstacles to proper functioning removed.  And these enforcement and 
corrective activities need to be carried out even though economics fail to 
provide a clear definition and framework of natural resource scarcity.  The 
recommendation of this review is to focus on particular features of natural 
resources specifically threatening the proper functioning of existing 
economic and noneconomic structures, rather than pursuing an elusive 
technical definition.  
 
